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Abstract Relatively little analysis has taken place internationally on the
consumer-reported benefits and costs to switching insurer in multi-payer health
insurance markets. Ideally, consumers should be willing to switch out of consid-
eration for price and quality and switching should be able to take place without
incurring significant switching costs. Costs to switching come in many forms
and understanding the nature of these costs is necessary if policy interventions
to improve market competition are to be successful. This study utilises data
from consumer surveys of the Irish health insurance market collected between
2009 and 2013 (N = 1,703) to examine consumer-reported benefits and costs
to switching insurer. Probit regression models are specified to examine the re-
lationship between consumer characteristics and reported switching costs, and
switching behaviour, respectively. Overall evidence suggests that switchers in
the Irish market mainly did so out of consideration for price. Transaction cost
was the most common switching cost identified, reported by just under 1 in 7
non-switchers. Psychological switching costs may also be impacting behaviour.
Moreover, high-risk individuals were more likely to experience switching costs
and this was reflected in actual switching behaviour. A recent informational
campaign launched by the market regulator may prove beneficial in reduc-
ing perceived transaction costs in the market, however, a more focused cam-
paign aimed at high-risk consumers may be necessary to reduce inequalities.
Policy-makers should also consider the impact insurer behaviour may have on
decision-making.
C. Keegan
Economic and Social Research Institute
Whitaker Square
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1 Introduction
In multi-payer health insurance markets, it is well recognised that the dynam-
ics of consumer mobility can provide key insights into understanding the com-
petitive environment in which these markets operate [58,44,4]. Particularly,
individuals should be willing to switch out of price and quality concerns to mo-
tivate insurers to compete along these parameters. However, costs to switching
also exist and these will also influence decision making [15]. High switching
costs can weaken competitive forces and inequalities can arise if certain groups
are more likely to experience these costs. Traditionally, however, focus has been
on understanding the determinants of actual switching behaviour. Additional
insights, however, can be gleaned from understanding consumer-reported ben-
efits and costs to switching. Particularly, costs to switching come in many
forms and in order to identify policy interventions to improve market com-
petitiveness it is necessary to understand the relative importance consumers
attach to these costs and their distribution across insured populations.
In this context, the focus of this study is threefold. Specifically, using the
Irish private health insurance market as the setting, this study hopes to 1) iden-
tify the main benefits and costs to switching insurer 2) determine whether the
costs of switching differ between groups of consumers and 3) determine whether
the observed distribution of switching costs is reflected in actual switching be-
haviour.This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways.
First, analysis of consumer-reported switching costs and benefits in health in-
surance markets has been very limited to date, and mainly concentrated on the
Dutch health system [15,51,33]. Very little is known about this topic in other
settings. This study expands our understanding by providing results from a
new institutional environment, the voluntary Irish private health insurance
market. Additionally, this paper uses a novel approach of employing a mul-
tivariate probit model to analyse the determinants of consumer responses to
switching motivations. This estimation technique addresses the problem that
individuals may possess unobservable characteristics that are correlated across
responses which can lead to in-consistent parameter estimates [10].
Section 2 reviews the conceptual and empirical literature on switching ben-
efits and costs. Section 3 provides and overview of the Irish health insurance
market. Section 4 introduces the data and methods. Section 5 and 6 present
and discuss the results, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Underlying standard consumer-decision making theory is the idea that con-
sumers are rational utility-maximising agents who operate on the basis of full
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and relevant information [60]. Conceptually, therefore, consumers will switch
insurer if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs [44]. Along these lines,
a significant body of research exists, across a number of health insurance
systems, that shows switchers are price-sensitive [8,14,52,18,54,19,50,6,35].
Quality, considered a more complex and multi-dimensional concept, has also
been shown to predict consumer choice in both the US and Netherlands [41,
6]. However, other studies suggest that Dutch consumers do not value quality
as a switching benefit [15,51]. Supplementary insurance benefits (in markets
where they exist) and gifts may also be considered switching benefits [15].
Switching rates in health insurance markets tend to be quite low [44],
and this may partly be a reflection of the level of switching costs faced by
consumers [19]. Particularly, observed differences in switching propensities are
often explained in that, cet par, low-risk individuals are thought to face lower
switching costs than their high-risk counterparts [16].
For instance, evidence would suggest that younger, wealthier1 and more
educated consumers tend to have higher switching propensities across a num-
ber of settings [2,7,47,33,6,19,58,51,16,35]. Evidence related to the relation-
ship between health status and switching propensity is slightly more nebu-
lous. Some studies have reported no relationship [51,16], however, many oth-
ers suggest that better health is independently and positively associated with
switching [47,33,6,35]. Although women are generally taken to utilise more
healthcare than men [3], evidence on gender effects in switching behaviour is
inconsistent [2,7,47,33,6,19].
Previous literature has identified a range of costs potentially faced by con-
sumers when switching firms [38,39,17]. Particularly, Duijmelinck et al [16]
recently provided a conceptual outline of switching costs directly relevant to
health insurance markets. Based on this literature a number of relevant costs
to switching can be identified;
– Search/evaluation costs - relate to the entire time spent identifying and
interpreting a firm’s product regardless of whether a purchase is made.
Search costs can be incurred multiple times [61].
– Transaction costs - relate to the time and effort, particularly administra-
tive, involved in switching insurer.
– Uncertainty costs - relate to the lack of certainty associated with alternative
insurer performance.
– Learning costs - relate to the time and effort learning about the policies
and procedures of a new insurer (e.g. claims processing).
– Benefit-loss costs - relate to the benefits foregone switching to a new insurer
(e.g. in markets where basic and supplementary insurance is closely tied,
consumers may lose favourable supplementary insurance benefits if they
switch).
1 One notable exception is the Israeli health insurance system where switching is found to
be an inferior good - those with higher labour-income were found to be less likely to switch
[56].
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– Provider switching costs - where selective contracting takes place, costs
may arise through severing relationships with existing healthcare providers
if they are not contracted with the new insurer.
– Psychological costs - It is important, however, to acknowledge that stan-
dard consumer-decision theory does not explain all observable behaviour.
Particularly, consumers may face a number of psychological (i.e. irrational)
costs as part of their decision-making which need to be taken into account.
Such bias can manifest in concepts such as loss aversion, status-quo bias,
endowment and loyalty effects [34,53,21,48,32].
In terms of search costs, evidence suggests that consumer decision-making
deteriorates when confronted with too much choice [46,57,9,13,20]. Notably,
Frank and Lamiraud [19] found that as the choice set offered to consumers
in the Swiss health insurance system increased, their willingness to switch
declined. Empirically, Duijmelinck et al [15] report that ‘benefit-loss’ costs
and psychological costs are the most prevalent in the Dutch health insurance
system. Psychological costs have also be shown to manifest in terms of status-
quo bias, leading to sub-optimal decision-making [5,42,45]. Along similar lines,
longer tenure of enrolment has been shown to reduce the likelihood of switching
between plans in the Swiss health insurance system [19]. In line with the review
of evidence of switching behaviour presented above, switching costs have been
shown to burden high risk individuals to a greater extent [15,45,51].
It is also important to make the distinction between the exogenous and
endogenous nature of switching costs. On the one hand, switching costs may be
exogenous, and experienced largely regardless of any behaviour by firms. Good
examples of such costs may relate to certain psychological costs of switching.
In contrast, endogenous switching costs relate to costs that are influenced by
firm behaviour [55,17]. For instance, firms may use marketing, product design
or promotional offers to artificially manipulate costs faced by consumers. This
type of behaviour may be particularly relevant to health insurance markets
where it may be possible to earn predictable profits by focusing resources on
attracting low-risk cohorts of consumers.
3 The Irish voluntary health insurance system
The Irish health system is predominantly government-financed, accounting for
69% of total health expenditure in 2014 [12]. However, despite publicly-funded
access to hospital care, approximately 46% of the population choose to pur-
chase voluntary private health insurance [26]. The benefits of private health
insurance relate mainly to faster access to elective hospital services along with
a greater choice of providers and accommodation. Private health insurance
plans can provide cover for non-acute services, such as GP and physiother-
apist services, but tend to reimburse only part of the cost. Private health
insurance therefore mainly fulfils a duplicative role (for hospital care) with
some elements of complementarity (limited cover for some primary care ser-
vices which are not publicly-funded for all residents). As a result, despite a
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large number of plans available on the market (around 200 in 2012 [59]) differ-
ences between plans largely stem from differences in access to types of hospital
accommodation[1]. Broadly speaking, privately-insured care takes place on a
semi-private2 or private room basis in either public or private hospitals3. All
insurers sell a variety of plans for different levels of hospital cover. Other vari-
ation in plan design tend to be relatively minor and often stem from market
segmentation strategies by insurers to channel low and high risk consumers
into different products [59]. For instance, the HIA notes that one way insurers
engage in risk selection is through offering lower cost products with reduced
orthopaedic benefits in private hospitals, which few older consumers tend to
purchase [24]. Individual and multiple-persons plans can be purchased with
discounts available for students and children.
The insurance market is heavily regulated operating under lifetime commu-
nity rating (which replaced a largely single-rate design in May 2015 to address
adverse selection issues [27]), open enrolment, lifetime cover and minimum
benefit regulations. Despite community rating restrictions, only recently (in
2013) have risk equalisation payments commenced4. These replaced a basic
system of additional age-related tax credits introduced in 2009. Recent evi-
dence suggests that despite the introduction of risk equalisation, incentives
for risk selection remain in the market [36]. The market is populated by four
insurers, with the Vhi commanding the largest market share (50.8%) [31].
Health insurance contracts are generally one year in length and at each
renewal period consumers are entitled to renew their current contract, switch
plan or insurer, or exit the market entirely. All insurers allow a 14-day cooling
off period from renewal dates whereby consumers may still cancel and get a full
refund but impose penalties after this point [29]. Individuals with pre-existing
conditions may switch plan or insurer without a break in cover. However, if an
individual switches to a new plan with higher cover there may be additional
waiting periods in respect of the extra benefits associated with the higher
cover [28]. Switching plan or insurer in the Irish market is a straightforward
process and ‘can be accomplished easily in a matter of minutes, by means of
two phone calls or online’ [11, pg. 72]. In an effort to aid consumer decision-
making, the market regulator, the Health Insurance Authority (HIA), provides
publicly available plan comparison and switching information on its website
(www.hia.ie).
2 This relates to multi-occupancy private rooms
3 However, since January 2014 it can also take place in a ward setting in public hospitals
4 While risk equalisation had previously been introduced to the market in 2003, payments
never actually took place due to a successful legal challenge taken by a former market insurer
(BUPA) [59].
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4 Data and Methods
4.1 Data
This study is based on market-wide cross-sectional consumer survey data ob-
tained from the HIA collected in 2009, 2011 and 2013, respectively [22,23,25].
Data for all years were collected by means of face-to-face interviews. Analysis
was restricted to those respondents who reported having private health insur-
ance cover in the year of survey and data for all years were pooled (N= 1,703).
Surveys included data on socio-demographic profiles, self-assessed health, prior
healthcare utilisation, history of insurer switching, questions related to moti-
vations for (not) switching and questions related to understanding of rules and
regulations governing the market. In order to ensure a representative sample
of the adult population in the Republic of Ireland (aged 18+) quotas were set
around sex, social class and region. The raw data were weighted to reflect the
national population.
4.2 Methods
In order to understand the motivations for switching and not switching in the
market, focus was placed on two specific questions asked to those with private
health insurance. These related to:
1. ‘Reasons for switching private health insurance provider?’
2. ‘Reasons for not switching private health insurance provider?’
For each question, respondents were given a range of non-mutually ex-
clusive responses to consider. In terms of the first question we only consid-
ered responses for those who could be identified as switching in the last four
years (the most disaggregated breakdown calculable)5. The second question
was asked to all those who never switched insurer (N=1,301). In order to de-
termine more dominant benefits and costs, responses to both questions were
ranked in terms of frequency, based on weighted percentages. In terms of ‘rea-
sons for not switching’, it was possible to match a number of responses to
actual switching costs identified in Section 2 (see Table 1).
Second, a multivariate probit model was estimated to determine if certain
groups of non-switchers were more likely to report these switching costs6.
Given that the questions on switching costs are multi-response there may
be unobservable individual-level factors that are correlated across equations.
The multivariate probit model (estimated using the mvprobit command in
Stata 13 ) accounts for this correlation resulting in consistent estimation. A
5-equation multivariate probit model is estimated, taking the following form,
5 This is a derived variable calculated by combining information on switching and con-
sumers’ length of time with their current insurer.
6 As the number of switchers was low, it was not possible to perform reliable regression
analysis to see if responses related to reasons for switching differed between groups.
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Table 1 Reasons for not switching insurer and associated type of switching cost
Reason for not switching insurer Associated switching cost
‘Too much hassle/paperwork’ Transaction cost
‘Couldn’t be bothered’ Psychological cost
‘Feel loyal to my current provider’ Psychological cost
‘Too difficult to compare plans’ Search cost
‘Concerned that coverage would not be the same’ Uncertainty cost
Y ∗m = αm +
6∑
k=1




1 if Y ∗m > 0
0 otherwise
Ym represent the 5 binary switching cost variables (identified in Table
1 coded as 1 if a respondent experienced the mth switching cost and zero
otherwise). Xk represent the set of consumer and plan characteristics (common
to all equations) and Z is a variable capturing the year of survey.
Errors em follow a multinormal distribution with zero mean and a variance-
covariance matrix with values of 1 on the main diagonal and correlation coef-
ficients ρjk = ρkj (j 6= k) as off-diagonal elements.
The likelihood function of this high-dimensional multivariate normal dis-
tributions is estimated through a simulated maximum likelihood procedure.
Specifically, this takes the form of the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) sim-
ulator. The accuracy of results will depend on the number of random draws
used in the calculations [10]. Cappellari and Jenkins [10] suggest setting the
number of draws at least equal to the square root of the sample size. Con-
sequently, we set the number of draws at 40. Finally, a basic single-equation
probit regression is also estimated to examine the relationship between con-
sumer characteristics and actual switching behaviour.
5 Results
Table 2 reports a descriptive summary of the variables of interest disaggregated
by year of survey and in terms of weighted and unweighted percentages. Just
over nineteen percent of the overall (weighted) sample were aged 65+, and
there was an even split between male and female respondents. Furthermore, the
majority of respondents belonged to ‘ABC1’ (57.4%) social grade, indicating
that it is those from higher socio-economic classes that generally purchase
health insurance. The proportion of respondents considering themselves in
‘Excellent’ health fell over time, with just over half (51%) reporting themselves
in this category. More than one adult was recorded on just over 71% of plans,
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Table 2 Percentage (unweighted percentage) breakdown of consumer and plan character-
istics by year of survey
2009 2011 2013 Total
(N=480) (N=424) (N=799) (N=1,703)
Age
18-44 49.7 (51.3) 45.2 (44.6) 43.7 (42.2) 45.7 (45.3)
45-64 35.4 (34.8) 33.9 (37.5) 35.8 (41.6) 35.2 (38.6)
65+ 14.9 (14) 20.9 (17.9) 20.6 (16.3) 19.1 (16)
Sex
Male 49.4 (49.2) 51 (48.8) 49.8 (47.8) 50 (48.4)
Female 50.6 (50.8) 49 (51.2) 50.2 (52.2) 50 (51.6)
Social Grade
ABC1 55.3 (54) 59.3 (65.8) 57.7 (63.1) 57.4 (61.2)
C2DE 34.6 (37.1) 32.4 (28.8) 33.4 (29.8) 33.5 (31.6)
F 10.1 (9) 8.3 (5.4) 8.9 (7.1) 9.1 (7.2)
Health Status
Excellent 56.6 (56.5) 49.7 (49.1) 48.4 (48.3) 51 (50.8)
Good 27.8 (27.5) 30.3 (30.9) 29.3 (29.9) 29.2 (29.5)
Bad 15.5 (16) 19.9 (20) 22.3 (21.8) 19.8 (19.7)
More than one
adult on plan
Yes 70.3 (69.6) 73.7 (69.8) 71.2 (72.5) 71.6 (71.0)
One or more
children on plan
Yes 43.5 (44.6) 31.5 (36.6) 32.3 (37.1) 35.2 (39.1)
Switched within
the last 4 years
Yes 7.3 (7.3) 14.9 (15.6) 12.9 (13.4) 11.8 (12.2)
Table 3 Top 5 reasons for switching insurer (switched in the last 4 years, weighted per-
centages)
Reason Total (%)
New insurer was cheaper/Cost savings 70.7
Level of cover was better 20.7
New insurer had a better product/service range 11.8
Group scheme switched 7.0
Recommendation from family member 4.9
while one of more children were present on just over 35% of plans. In total,
just under 12% of respondents switched in the last four years.
5.1 Reasons for switching insurer
Table 3 presents the five most frequently cited reasons for switching insurer.
As expected, cost savings was by far the most influential reason for switching,
cited by 70.7% overall. Quality, as proxied by ‘level of cover’ was the next
most frequent response, cited by 20.7% overall. Another proxy for quality
‘newer insurer had a better product/service range’ was cited by 11.8%, overall.
‘Group scheme switched’ (7.0%) and ‘recommendation from family member’
(4.9%) made up the remainder of responses.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
Table 4 Reasons for not switching insurer (weighted percent-
ages)
Reason Total (%)
Satisfied with current provider 40.6
Level of cover no better 14.5
Too much hassle/paperwork 14.5
Couldn’t be bothered 11.2
Range of products/services no better 10.0
Not my decision 9.1
Feel loyal to my current provider 8.3
Been with existing provider for a long time 8.3
Work/employer looks after it 7.9
Don’t know 7.7
Too difficult to compare plans 7.2
Concerned that coverage would not be the same 5.7
a Truncated at positive responses greater than 5%.
b Responses in italics indicate identified switching costs in-
cluded in the probit regressions. ‘Been with my existing
provider for a long time’ was not considered due to endo-
geneity concerns.
5.2 Reasons for not switching insurer
Table 4 reports on consumer reasons for not switching insurer. Chiefly, respon-
dents did not switch because they were ‘satisfied with their current provider’,
cited by 40.6%, overall. However, certain individuals were discouraged from
switching due to perceived lack of product and service differentiation between
insurers. 14.5% cited ‘level of cover no better’ and 10.0% cited ‘range of prod-
ucts/services no better’ as reasons for not switching insurer.
Certain switching costs could also be identified as popular reasons for not
switching. Particularly, ‘too much hassle/paperwork’ (14.5%) and ‘couldn’t
be bothered’ (11.2%) were the third and fourth most common reasons for
not switching insurer. As outlined in Table 1, these relate to transaction and
psychological costs, respectively. Other psychological costs of switching were
also identified. ‘Feel loyal to my current provider’ and ‘been with existing
provider for a long time’ were cited by 8.3% of respondents. Explicit search
costs seem to play slightly less of a role. ‘Too difficult to compare plans’ was
cited by 7.2% of respondents. Finally, uncertainty costs, manifested in terms
of ‘concerned that coverage would not be the same’ were only cited by 5.7%
of non-switchers as a reason for not switching.
Table 5 presents results for the multivariate probit model. While no com-
mon associations are observable across all switching costs, some trends do
emerge. Particularly, older and sicker consumers, respectively, appear to per-
ceive higher switching costs than their younger and healthier counterparts.
Compared to those aged 18-44, those aged 45-64 (p <0.05) were more likely
to cite ‘too much hassle/paperwork’ as a reason for not switching. Similarly,
those with ‘bad’ self-reported health status were more likely to find it difficult
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to compare plans (p <0.05). Apathy towards the switching decision (‘couldn’t
be bothered’) was more likely to be cited by those in worse self-reported health
states (p <0.05). While older individuals were more likely to experience loy-
alty towards their current provider (p <0.01). Finally, there is some evidence
that while having one or more adults on a plan may reduce the likelihood of
reporting certain switching costs, having one or more children on a plan does
not impact on switching costs.
The overall distribution of these consumer-reported switching costs is also
presented in Figure 1. The overall joint probability of not reporting a switching
cost in our sample is 60.8%. However, those who are older and in worse health
status, respectively, were significantly less likely not to report a switching cost.
Reflecting these findings, being older, or in bad self-perceived health, were
both negatively associated with switching insurer. On average, those aged
65+ were 4.9 percentage points less likely to switch than those aged 18-44 (p
<0.05), relative to a (weighted) baseline switching rate of 11.8%. Similarly,
those with ‘Bad’ self-perceived health status were 4.4 percentage points less
likely to switch relative to those with ‘Excellent’ self-perceived health status.
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Fig. 1 Joint probability of no switching cost reported (95% confidence intervals). The joint
probability is defined as Pr(y1 = 0, y2 = 0, y3 = 0, y4 = 0, y5 = 0).
6 Discussion
Switching rates in and of themselves may not provide a good insight into
the dynamics of market competition. For instance, even a small amount of
switching in a contestable market environment may be sufficient to facilitate
competitive behaviour while too much switching may be undesirable as it can
result in high administrative costs [16]. However, more understanding can be
gained from analysing the motivations for switching and whether significant
barriers to switching exist.
6.1 Switching benefits
As such, an important requirement of competitive health insurance markets
is that price and quality considerations guide consumer demand. Therefore, a
salient finding is that consumers in the Irish market do appear to be strongly
motivated by price considerations. As described in Section 2, this agrees with
previous findings in the Irish system and other systems internationally. Qual-
ity, in contrast, both in terms of level of cover and also product and service
range, motivated switching to a much lesser degree than price. As a conse-
quence, there may be less reason for insurers to compete along these quality
parameters.
6.2 Switching costs
A large proportion of consumers appear satisfied with their insurance offering
and may not switch for that reason. This reflects findings in the Swiss health
insurance system where 79 per cent of consumers reported remaining with their
health plan due to satisfaction with their current insurance arrangement [19].
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However, our results suggest that switching costs may be acting as an imped-
iment to ease of switching in the Irish market. Particularly, transaction costs
were identified as the most prominent switching cost in the market, cited by
just under 1 in 7 non-switchers as a reason for not switching. In contrast, only
between 4-6% of non-switchers in the Dutch system identified administration
and transaction costs as a reason for not switching [15,51]. As switching in-
surer at time of renewal can be considered a relatively straightforward process
in the Irish system, this cost may therefore be more perceived than actual.
Although the HIA does provide information on the switching process there
appears to be a degree of friction between the availability of this information
and consumers’ use of it [40]. For instance, in 2013, 61% of the insured popu-
lation had either no knowledge of the HIA or were aware of the HIA but were
unaware of its functions [25]. Interventions to improve consumer awareness of
the HIA and information on the switching process may therefore prove worth-
while in reducing perceived transaction costs in the market. In this regard,
an information campaign launched by the HIA in November 2016 represents
a positive development [30].
Given the large number of plans on the market for consumers to choose
from, it is perhaps surprising that consumers do not consider difficulty in plan
comparison as more of a major switching barrier. Despite the large number
of plans, however, the important dimensions of plan choice perhaps centre on
level of hospital cover and price - two easily comparable plan dimensions. As
noted, many plans differ based on other relatively minor characteristics and
consumers may place less weight on these factors (if any) in their decision-
making. Another explanation is that the provision of comparative plan in-
formation by the HIA may be facilitating easier comparison across the many
plans on the market. However, as noted above, many consumers appear un-
aware of the HIA as a source of this information and therefore this may be
unlikely.
Some evidence of possible psychological switching costs were observed. Just
under one-in-nine non-switchers cited apathy towards the switching process as
a reason for not switching. In reality this apathy may be indicative of other
switching barriers [11]. For instance, if transaction costs are high, consumers
may see little value in engaging with the switching process. Loyalty to cur-
rent insurer was also identified as a relevant psychological switching cost. We
consider loyalty to be a psychological switching barrier in the Irish system as
economic incentives (for instance gifts or discounts) for loyalty are not features
of the Irish system. However, this may not be the case in all health insurance
systems where loyalty to an existing insurer may be considered more of a
rational response.
The level of psychological switching costs identified in the Irish market
may not be excessive. However, psychological switching costs, if they exist,
can create problems for policy-makers looking to improve behaviour as it is
difficult to design interventions to address these costs. For instance, it may
be challenging to encourage switching for individuals who are loyal to their
14 Conor Keegan et al.
current insurer and refuse to consider contracting with alternative insurers.
Differences between groups
From a competitive perspective it is also important to consider if reasons
non-switchers do not switch, differ between groups. In this context, evidence
suggests that overall, high-risk consumers are more likely to experience barri-
ers to switching than their low-risk counterparts. This is also reflected in ac-
tual switching behaviour. Older individuals and those with worse self-reported
health status were less likely to switch. Similar findings are common among
many other health insurance systems and are generally explained in terms of
these individuals facing higher costs to switching [15,43].
In terms of these costs, older individuals were more likely to experience
loyalty towards their current insurer. In this context, it could be the case
that as individuals age their values change and they may be more likely to
exhibit such behaviour. Over time it could also be the case that individuals
build up a relationship or bond with their insurer, making it more difficult to
switch. Alternatively, older individuals are perhaps simply more conservative
and, consequently, may be less willing to switch [49].
Although difficulty with plan comparison is not a frequently cited switch-
ing cost overall, older and sicker individuals appear more likely to experience
it. As an explanation, older and sicker individuals may inherently find plan
comparison more difficult. However, these individuals may also place a higher
weight on more complex plan dimensions (other than price) such as the techni-
calities of depth and breadth of coverage. This may increase difficulty of plan
comparison. The fact that those in worse health are more likely to display ap-
athy towards the switching process may partly reflect this difficulty7. Further
investigation, therefore, may be warranted to see if improving these individ-
uals’ awareness of, and ability to comprehend, plan comparison information
could help reduce inequalities in the market.
Finally, it is important also to be cognisant of the role insurers may play
in influencing the distribution of search and switching costs. This can occur if
insurers have incentives to engage in risk selection. In the Irish system evidence
exists that risk equalisation may not be adequately reimbursing insurers for
the risk they hold, therefore encouraging risk selection [36]. In Ireland risk
selection is generally understood to take the form of targeting of preferred risk
groups through, for example, advertising, marketing and product design [1]. If
risk selection is taking place in the Irish market it is most likely accentuating
the switching of more mobile, healthy risks.
7 Disinterest in plan comparison for very sick individuals could also be related to perceived
high opportunity costs of time (i.e. a short life expectancy). In such instances, apathy may
be considered a rational response, as it may not be in these individuals’ interests to spend
time comparing health insurance products.
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a Asked to all those with private health insurance.
b *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
6.3 Limitations
Before concluding it is important to outline some limitations of this analysis.
Particularly, this analysis was restricted somewhat by the nature of the survey
data collected. Switching costs identified were determined by the motivations
for consumer decision-making recorded in the surveys. For instance, it was not
possible to identify the presence of benefit-loss or provider switching costs in
the market. However, a priori it is unlikely that these costs represent major
barriers to switching in the Irish market. Unlike other European systems, the
voluntary Irish market is not structured in terms of basic and supplementary
insurance (where in the Netherlands, benefit-loss represents a major switching
cost [15]) while, as noted, selective contracting with providers is uncommon.
Moreover, only minimal information was captured on actual switching be-
haviour which limited this aspect of the analysis. However, the associations
identified did reflect previous, more detailed, findings on consumer switching
in the Irish system [35]. It is also important to acknowledge that the study
time horizon coincided with a period of significant economic turmoil in Ireland
[37] which may impact on the interpretability of results. Finally, it was not
possible to determine the impact insurer behaviour had on consumer-reported
switching costs and this represents an potential avenue of future research.
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7 Conclusion
The analysis offers fresh empirical insights into consumer mobility in multi-
payer health insurance markets through examining the consumer-reported
benefits and costs to switching health insurer. This study used the private
health insurance market in Ireland as an environment to study these dynam-
ics. Overall evidence suggests that switchers in the Irish market mainly did so
out of consideration for price. This should encourage insurers in the market to
compete along this dimension. However some potential barriers to switching
were identified, with transaction costs the most frequently cited. In general
consumer-reported switching costs were experienced more by high-risk indi-
viduals and this was also reflected in actual switching behaviour. A recent
information campaign launched by the market regulator may prove beneficial
in reducing perceived transaction costs in the market, however, a more focused
campaign aimed at high-risk consumers may be necessary to reduce inequal-
ities in the market. Policy-makers should also consider the impact insurer
behaviour may have on consumer mobility.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the HIA for access to their consumer
survey data. This research was funded by the Health Research Board PHD/2007/16.
8 Appendix
8.1 Variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms reported in
the multivariate probit model of switching costs (Table 5)
Equations excl. plan characteristics
V1 =





e3 −0.13 .025 1
e4 .367
∗∗∗ .230∗∗∗ .163∗ 1
e5 −.039 −.101 .159∗ .242∗∗∗ 1

Likelihood ratio test that all correlation coefficients equal zero; χ2 (10) =
60.3298∗∗∗
Equations incl. all variables
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V2 =





e3 −.020 0.006 1
e4 .352
∗∗∗ .233∗∗∗ .173∗∗ 1
e5 −.044 −.114 .141 .243∗∗∗ 1

Likelihood ratio test that all correlation coefficients equal zero; χ2 (10) =
58.0019∗∗∗
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